



BAZE-D AND CONFUSED:  WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH LETHAL 
INJECTION? 
On January 7th, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the 
case of Baze v. Rees, which asks the Justices to examine the constitutio-
nality of Kentucky’s lethal injection methodology.  As the Court deli-
berates over the issues involved, an informal nationwide moratorium 
on lethal injections has been established.  In this Debate Professors 
Alison J. Nathan, of Fordham University, and Douglas A. Berman, of 
The Ohio State University, tease out the legal, political, and practical 
issues that the Court faces as it addresses Baze. 
In her Opening, Professor Nathan critiques the irrationality of the 
three-formula lethal injection procedure used by Kentucky and many 
other states.   Professor Nathan writes that “lethal injection as perva-
sively practiced in the United States today is the result of a historical 
accident, not scientifically informed deliberation.” She contends that 
the sort of democratic reform that has been the catalyst for legislative 
changes in execution procedures in the past has been stymied by “le-
thal injection’s peculiar history, attendant secrecy, and protocol in-
volving the use of [a] pain-masking paralytic drug.”  She concludes by 
arguing that “[i]n this context of non-transparency, it is distinctly the 
role and responsibility of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to 
scrutinize the practice of lethal injection and its history.” 
Professor Berman agrees that “the development and administra-
tion of lethal injection protocols have been haphazard and sloppy.”  
However, his concern is principally focused on why the lack of a dem-
ocratic reform movement has failed to raise the consciousness of the 
nation.  He contends that “three critical practical and political reali-
ties” explain the absence of a national backlash:  in sum, 1) no hu-
man-administered death penalty system can be perfect; 2) few Ameri-
cans care to make a perfect system; and 3) most Americans are 
“blissfully ignorant” of any such “imperfections.”  Through his “real-
politik” lenses, Professor Berman remains skeptical that the Justices 
will be able to rise above “the broader practical and political realities 
that surround the modern administration of capital punishment [and 
help] ensure that the machinations of death . . . persist.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Lethal Injection’s Known Unknowns 
Alison J. Nathan† 
The United States Supreme Court has recently heard oral argu-
ment in the case of Baze v. Rees, a constitutional challenge to the lethal 
injection procedures that Kentucky uses to execute death row in-
mates.  Kentucky’s lethal injection formula is the same employed by 
almost every death penalty state in the country.  As a result, the day 
after the Court granted certiorari in Baze, I argued that because the 
Supreme Court is considering the standard by which such challenges 
must be judged, for the sake of even-handed and deliberative justice, 
all lethal injection executions across the nation should be stayed 
pending the Court’s decision in Baze (see http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ 
forumy/2007/09/pausing-machinery-of-death-supreme.php).  One 
execution did go forward in Texas on the same day that Baze was 
granted, apparently as a result of the refusal by the Chief Justice of the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to allow the twenty-minute late filing 
of the condemned man’s stay request.  Since that time, however, every 
scheduled execution (nineteen as of the time of this writing) has been 
temporarily stayed by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, state 
courts, or governors.  This national pausing of the machinery of death 
has garnered significant press attention and some controversy, even 
leading a few commentators to suggest that lethal injection challenges 
are, at base, nothing more than a death-row delay tactic.  This is a sig-
nificant error.  How states execute convicted defendants is an issue 
that implicates important aspects of governmental transparency and 
democratic reform, and should be a serious concern both to those 
who support the death penalty and those who oppose it.  What we 
know about how states and the federal government currently execute 
people in the United States is deeply troubling—troubling enough 
that the Supreme Court has involved itself in the controversy.  But the 
real danger of lethal injection as currently practiced lies in what we do 
not know.  A number of historical and structural factors have coa-
 
† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Professor Na-
than is counsel of record for an amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioners in Baze 
v. Rees, which she filed on behalf of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Ford-
ham University School of Law.   
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lesced to shroud the administration of lethal injection in secrecy.  
These factors have entrenched, rather than cured, a needlessly cruel 
practice.  This lack of transparency must change, and it is the exis-
tence of constitutional judicial review that will ensure that it does. 
One thing we know for sure about lethal injection is its macabre 
history.  As shown by the research of one of the leading experts in this 
field, Professor Deborah Denno of Fordham University School of Law, 
lethal injection as pervasively practiced in the United States today is 
the result of a historical accident, not scientifically informed delibera-
tion.  The genesis of today’s method of lethal injection can be traced 
to 1976, the year the Supreme Court decided Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153 (1976), and ended the nine-year execution hiatus that had begun 
in the period leading up to the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972).  After almost a decade without an execution, intense 
public scrutiny accompanied the preparations for the post-Gregg ex-
ecutions.  In this context, and in order to help maintain public sup-
port for the death penalty, some state legislators scrambled to find a 
more humane substitute to the viscerally brutal and painful electric 
chair or gas chamber, the two methods that previously had gained na-
tional dominance but were facing increasing public scrutiny and criti-
cism.  Legislators in Oklahoma moved first. 
Seeking guidance on how to carry out a potentially more humane 
execution, two Oklahoma state senators turned to the state’s chief 
medical examiner, Dr. A. Jay Chapman.  Although Dr. Chapman con-
ceded that he lacked relevant training or expertise—stating at the 
time that he “‘was an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in get-
ting them that way,’” Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quan-
dary:  How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 49, 66 (2007)—he conjured up a procedure that would become 
the basis for lethal injection protocols nationwide.  The Oklahoma 
legislators did not receive input from experts, did not conduct or 
commission any studies, and failed to consider the foreseeable admin-
istrative difficulties and dangers of Dr. Chapman’s proposed proce-
dure.  Nevertheless, in 1977, Oklahoma’s legislature adopted Dr. 
Chapman’s method and delegated important details—what specific 
drugs to use, what dosage to administer, who would administer the 
drugs and how—to unqualified prison officials who made administra-
tive decisions free from public scrutiny and oversight.  After further 
consultation between Dr. Chapman and state prison officials, Okla-
homa became the first state to adopt a three-drug lethal injection pro-
tocol—a short-acting anesthetic, a paralyzing agent, and a heart-
stopping drug—as its preferred method of execution.  Texas followed 
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immediately afterwards, becoming the first state to actually carry out a 
lethal injection execution, which it did in 1982, using the three-drug 
protocol. 
Despite the inadequate origins of Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol, a ripple effect soon occurred.  State after state followed Ok-
lahoma’s lead, uncritically borrowing its new three-drug formula and 
delegating important details to state prison officials who lacked perti-
nent experience and knowledge.  By 2002, thirty-seven states had 
switched to lethal injection, with all but one state employing Dr. 
Chapman’s original three-drug formula.  Yet none of these states en-
gaged in any additional medical or scientific study of the method they 
were adopting.  Historical accident (or what sociologists would call a 
“cascade to mistaken consensus”) explains far better than science or 
medicine the current ubiquity of the three-drug protocol. 
We also know, as a result of information just beginning to emerge, 
that there have been seriously flawed lethal injection executions.  For 
example, in May of 2007, an Ohio inmate named Christopher Newton 
appeared to be suffocating alive during parts of an execution that 
lasted almost two hours.  Newton’s botched execution came one year 
after a similarly controversial execution in Ohio that lasted approx-
imately ninety minutes and caused the state to reexamine its execu-
tion procedures.  This execution was sufficiently gruesome that the 
brother of the victim, who witnessed the execution, has gone on 
record condemning the lethal injection process as unnecessarily cruel.  
As another example, it took the state of Florida thirty-four minutes to 
execute Angel Diaz in 2006.  During that time Diaz was flailing, gasp-
ing for air, grimacing, and struggling to breathe.  A postexecution in-
vestigation concluded that Diaz was likely not properly anesthetized 
during the execution.  According to the Florida Supreme Court, the 
execution “raised legitimate concerns about the adequacy of Florida’s 
lethal injection procedures and the ability of the [Department of Cor-
rections] to implement them.”  Lightbourne v. McCollum, No. SC06-
2391, 2007 WL 3196533, at *16 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2007).  Given the inci-
dences of error-prone and flawed executions, it is unsurprising that 
the three-drug protocol is forbidden for use in animal euthanasia by 
most states. 
The public also is beginning to learn that unqualified individuals 
are providing guidance and participating in executions, creating cir-
cumstances ripe for error.  In addition to relying on Dr. Chapman’s 
admittedly inexpert opinions, many states received guidance in admi-
nistering lethal injection from Fred Leuchter, who was a leading fig-
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ure in the execution equipment “business” of electric chairs and gas 
chambers.  Despite Mr. Leuchter’s dearth of experience with lethal 
injection, states relied on his advice for years before they learned, dur-
ing the course of his providing testimony about gas chambers in sup-
port of a holocaust denier, that he had lied about his scientific qualifi-
cations and educational background, for which he was subsequently 
prosecuted.  Yet Mr. Leuchter’s “lethal injection machine” played a 
role in further entrenching the three-drug protocol nationwide. 
Similarly, recent lethal injection litigation in Missouri exposed 
that the doctor involved in that state’s lethal injection executions, 
known as “Dr. Doe” because his identity was steadfastly guarded by 
Missouri, was the subject of more than twenty malpractice suits and 
suffers from a form of dyslexia that affects his ability to prepare the 
drug combinations properly.  As a result of this information, a federal 
judge in Missouri banned his participation in future executions.  Tay-
lor v. Crawford, No. 2:05-CV-04173-FJG, at 2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2006), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/ 
LethalInjection/Public/MoralesTaylorAmicus/27.pdf.  Despite this, 
the Los Angeles Times recently reported that the very same doctor has 
continued to assist the federal government in preparing lethal injec-
tion executions of federal inmates.  There is also evidence emerging 
of ill-trained executioners in California, including one who smuggled 
illegal drugs into the prison.  And in Kentucky, the execution protocol 
allowed improperly trained executioners to insert catheters into an 
inmate’s neck despite a doctor’s refusal to do so.  Even Dr. Chapman 
now agrees that the wrong drugs are being used and that states should 
be compelled to use expert personnel rather than the “complete 
idiots . . . [w]hich we seem to have.”  Denno, supra, at 73. 
Arguably more alarming than what we know of the current prac-
tice of lethal injection is what we do not know.  Several aspects of the 
history of lethal injection have caused a continued repression of pub-
lic knowledge and scrutiny of the procedure and its implementation.  
First, public scrutiny of the three-drug protocol has been stifled be-
cause, in copying Oklahoma, state after state has adopted the unne-
cessary paralytic agent as its second drug.  The nature of this drug is to 
mask the realities of the execution from meaningful public scrutiny.  A 
paralyzed inmate suffering pain during the execution will be physical-
ly unable to express his suffering.  As a result, witnesses, including 
members of the media who report executions to the public, see only a 
sanitized version.  Unaware of the painful suffering endured by in-
mates, the public has assumed wrongly that states always execute in-
mates in a humane and painless manner. 
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Second, by copying Oklahoma’s vague lethal injection protocol, 
states also have followed Oklahoma in delegating critical implementa-
tion decisions to department of corrections personnel.  The proce-
dures these personnel develop are often exempt from state adminis-
trative law notice-and-comment requirements or have been treated as 
exempt by prison personnel.  As a result, prison officials’ critical lethal 
injection implementation decisions—what specific drugs to use, what 
dosage amounts, and how to administer the drugs—have remained 
hidden from public scrutiny. 
Third, states have frustrated attempts to evaluate lethal injection 
protocols and procedures by tenaciously guarding the information as 
secret and nonpublic.  In addition to refusing to release information 
about the qualifications and training of executioners, states also con-
ceal execution procedures by limiting witnesses’ ability to view por-
tions of the execution process and by refusing to release postexecu-
tion autopsy information.  The public, therefore, is precluded from 
learning of flawed procedures, incompetent administration, and ex-
ecution errors. 
Taken together, lethal injection’s peculiar history, attendant 
secrecy, and protocol involving the use of the pain-masking paralytic 
drug have produced—and continue to produce—a failure of demo-
cratic reform.  In the past, public scrutiny of cruel punishment prac-
tices led to legislative changes.  For example, in the early-to-mid-
twentieth century, nearly every state sought to introduce a more hu-
mane method of execution when the public learned of the actual hor-
rors of the electric chair, and deemed electrocution to be too barbaric 
and open to a high risk of pain and error relative to other available 
options.  The same was true for hanging before electrocution and the 
gas chamber.  In contrast, the factors described here have led to sys-
tematic and continued repression of public information related to le-
thal injection’s actual procedures and administration, undermining a 
similar process of public deliberation and democratic reform.  As a re-
sult, a needlessly risky and unnecessarily cruel method has become en-
trenched.  This is true despite readily available alternatives such as the 
method veterinarians typically use to euthanize animals:  a massive 
overdose of a single drug barbiturate.  Veterinarians favor this ap-
proach because it does not carry a significant risk of pain even if unfo-
reseen errors in the implementation process occur. 
In this context of non-transparency, it is distinctly the role and re-
sponsibility of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to scrutinize 
the practice of lethal injection and its history, as well as to see through 
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the ill-informed and reflexive state decision making that has perpe-
tuated an execution method that needlessly risks severe and unneces-
sary pain. 
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REBUTTAL 
The Bliss of Ignorance and the Perfection Problem 
Douglas A. Berman† 
Professor Nathan’s Opening Statement provides an effective ac-
count of why the Supreme Court has now finally come to examine the 
constitutionality of modern execution procedures.  As she spotlights, 
the development and administration of lethal injection protocols have 
been haphazard and sloppy, and state internal reviews of protocols 
have mostly been nonexistent or perfunctory.  Jurisdictions that utilize 
the death penalty generally have not fulfilled their moral and consti-
tutional obligations to ensure that unreasonable execution methods 
are not utilized.  I thus agree with Professor Nathan that, in light of 
the failings of other branches, “it is distinctly the role and responsibili-
ty of the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, to scrutinize” prevailing 
lethal injection protocols. 
But Professor Nathan’s essay fails to examine the reasons why so 
many states have tended to repress “public information related to le-
thal injection’s actual procedures and administration” and the deeper 
death penalty dilemmas that in part account for the absence of a 
“process of public deliberation and democratic reform” concerning 
prevailing protocols.  Specifically, Professor Nathan does not grapple 
with three critical practical and political realities that surround the 
modern administration of capital punishment:  (1) a perfect death 
penalty system is practically impossible for fallible humans to create 
and maintain; (2) few persons actively involved with or concerned 
about modern death penalty systems are genuinely interested in mak-
ing these systems more perfect; and (3) the vast majority of democrat-
ic lawmakers and the public in general is blissfully ignorant of the 
modern death penalty’s imperfections.  These critical practical and 
political realities infect all legal and social debates over capital pu-
nishment, and they significantly impede effective tinkering with the 
machinery of death.  Though each of these realities justifies a lengthy 
law review article, here I will briefly unpack them with an emphasis on 
how they impact the lethal injection debate. 
 
† William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz Col-
lege of Law.  Professor Berman has written extensively on lethal injection litigation at 
his blog, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://www.sentencing.typepad.com. 
2008] BAZE-D AND CONFUSED 320 
1.  Fallibility.  In the words of renowned pop philosopher Hannah 
Montana, “Nobody’s perfect.”  Indeed, the reality of human error is 
often stressed by death penalty opponents who contend that even the 
smallest risks of wrongful executions justify the abolition of capital 
punishment.  In the wake of death row exonerations, the fallibility ar-
gument resonates with many, but this argument is largely inconsistent 
with how we assess other governmental functions.  The well-known 
and unavoidable risk of human error does not keep governments 
from engaging in many life-and-death activities—ranging from waging 
war to regulating drug safety to running a public transit system—if the 
public and lawmakers view the benefits of these activities to be worth 
the risks.  Of course, governments generally aspire to reduce the risks 
of human error as much as possible, but nobody argues that city buses 
should stop running when one driver negligently causes a fatal crash. 
In the context of lethal injection protocols, the reality of human 
fallibility means that there will always be at least some risk of error and 
unnecessary pain in any state killing process.  Of course, the selection 
of execution methods and execution personnel can greatly impact the 
magnitude of these risks:  hangings conducted by untrained govern-
ment officials—the execution norm throughout most of American 
history—surely will create greater risks of error and unnecessary pain 
than lethal injections conducted by trained medical personnel. 
As Professor Nathan notes, over the last century governments have 
generally aspired to adopt more humane methods of execution, ap-
parently recognizing that they should try to minimize the risk of error 
and unnecessary pain in administering the death penalty.  Problemat-
ically, as Professor Nathan stresses, a “cascade to mistaken consensus” 
has led nearly all capital jurisdictions to adopt an imperfect three-drug 
lethal injection protocol.  And yet, there is little doubt that the prevail-
ing protocol is still a significant improvement over other execution 
methods; defendants are not clamoring for a return of the hangman’s 
noose or the electric chair, and capital jurisdictions are not seriously 
considering building new gas chambers or assembling firing squads.  
The formal terms of the modern debate over lethal injection proto-
cols concern whether states, after having adopted an improved, but 
still flawed execution method, should now have to make their proto-
cols even more perfect.  But, as explained below, few persons actively 
involved with, or seriously concerned about, modern death penalty 
systems are genuinely interested in trying to make these systems more 
perfect. 
2.  Modern Disinterest in an Even More Perfect System.  For nearly all 
death row defendants, their lawyers, and opponents of capital pu-
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nishment, the only perfect death penalty system is one that has been 
abolished.  Though death penalty opponents regularly chronicle flaws 
in capital punishment’s administration, rarely do they seriously advo-
cate realistic legislative reforms that would enable modern death pe-
nalty systems to operate more efficiently and regularly.  Notably, death 
penalty opponents spotlight tales of wrongful convictions and botched 
executions primarily to boost their advocacy for the elimination of 
capital punishment altogether.  Indeed, sophisticated abolitionists 
realize that a death penalty system made truly more perfect is a death 
penalty system more likely to garner broad public support and in-
crease the number of state executions of convicted murderers. 
For nearly all prosecutors and supporters of capital punishment, 
existing death penalty systems are already, in a sense, too perfect be-
cause they readily enable defendants and their advocates to delay or 
avoid the ultimate sanction.  With decades often elapsing between a 
capital verdict and even the setting of an execution date, proponents 
of capital punishment are understandably far more concerned about 
repeated appeals and extensive delays than they are troubled by the 
occasional anecdote of a wrongful conviction or a botched execution 
of a gruesome murderer.  Moreover, sophisticated proponents of cap-
ital punishment realize that serious efforts to perfect a death penalty 
system will provide defense lawyers and abolitionists with new oppor-
tunities to impede the progress of any murderer toward a state’s death 
chamber. 
Outside the context of lethal injection debates, there is ample evi-
dence that few advocates are genuinely interested in making the ad-
ministration of capital punishment more perfect.  A few years ago, 
then-Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney assembled a blue-ribbon 
panel of experts to devise a death penalty system for his state that he 
deemed “as foolproof as humanly possible.”  Letter from Mitt Rom-
ney, Governor of Mass., to Members of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the Commonwealth of Mass. (Apr. 28, 2005) (on file 
with author).  Tellingly, his proposed more-perfect system received 
virtually no support in Massachusetts:  it was attacked on numerous 
grounds by both death penalty proponents and opponents.  Moreo-
ver, the astute procedural and substantive reforms suggested by Rom-
ney’s blue-ribbon panel—like those of many other groups of lawyers 
urging capital improvements—have found few serious advocates and 
have had virtually no traction in modern legislative debates in those 
jurisdictions still in the business of state killing. 
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The pragmatic disinterest in death penalty perfection largely ac-
counts for why states have tended, in Professor Nathan’s words, to re-
press “public information related to lethal injection’s actual proce-
dures and administration.”  State officials believe, quite justifiably, that 
any information-sharing good deed will be punished through new 
rounds of litigation brought by death row defendants and death pe-
nalty opponents.  State officials believe, quite justifiably, that most 
everyone complaining about lethal injection protocols will not start 
endorsing capital punishment if and when the state successfully de-
velops a more perfect execution method.  And, perhaps even more 
importantly, state officials believe, also justifiably, that very few per-
sons are genuinely concerned about relatively minor imperfections in 
the administration of the death penalty. 
3.  Ignorance Is Bliss.  For the vast majority of the public and law-
makers, the death penalty is a highly symbolic and inconsequential 
aspect of governmental work.  Even in the few active death penalty 
states, capital cases are a tiny component of massive state criminal jus-
tice systems and an even more miniscule part of state governments’ 
broader activities.  Practically speaking, the average citizen is impacted 
far more by street cleaning schedules and school lunch menus than by 
the day-to-day administration of the death penalty.  Moreover, the av-
erage citizen assumes—correctly—that most prosecutors and judges 
generally aspire to reduce the most extreme risks of error in the oper-
ation of the death penalty.  Politically speaking, the average lawmaker 
recognizes that voters will care about her basic position on the death 
penalty, but she also realizes that the symbolism of her position is far 
more important than any specifics. 
These practical and political realities mean that the vast majority 
of lawmakers and members of the public are blissfully ignorant con-
cerning the modern death penalty’s imperfections.  Indeed, only the 
most engaged activists even try to keep up with the copious research 
about the modern operation of the death penalty, and often lawmak-
ers will resist efforts to commission official studies of the death penal-
ty’s administration.  Of course, neither the general public nor law-
makers favor a deeply flawed death penalty system, and profound 
evidence of wrongful convictions or botched executions will often 
prompt executive officials and legislators to begin a serious program 
of reform.  But when identified problems appear to be minor imper-
fections and not gross injustices, most people remain more interested 
in the death penalty as an idea than as a practice.  Indeed, by paying 
little attention to the death penalty in practice, the public and their 
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elected representatives can hold onto the blissfully ignorant belief that 
our existing death penalty systems are as perfect as possible. 
In the context of lethal injection protocols, the reality of blissful 
ignorance is reflected in the fact that few are advocating for perfect 
transparency.  In our modern technological era, greater transparency 
concerning lethal injection protocols could be easily achieved by hav-
ing all jurisdictions digitally record all executions.  But, to my know-
ledge, nobody has even seriously suggested videotaping all executions.  
(It is notable, and telling, that thanks to a sneaky cell phone and You-
Tube, more Americans have seen the execution of Saddam Hussein 
than any of the 1099 modern executions in the United States.) 
These broader realities have an intriguing resonance now that the 
lethal injection debates have finally reached the Supreme Court in 
Baze.  Notably, the Supreme Court’s modern death penalty jurispru-
dence seems to be driven, in fits and starts, by the goal of creating an 
ever more perfect death penalty system through persistent tinkering 
with the machinery of death.  And, unlike the public and lawmakers, 
the Justices cannot remain blissfully ignorant to the historical, medical 
and legal issues surrounding lethal injection protocols and their im-
perfections.  I am not sure what this will mean for the Court’s forth-
coming work in Baze, but the points stressed above must be consi-
dered in understanding the likely reactions of the public and the 
likely responses of government officials after Baze—no matter what the 
Justices say. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Alison J. Nathan 
On several key points related to Baze v. Rees, Professor Berman 
and I agree.  Importantly, we appear to agree that state lethal injec-
tion protocols have been developed and administered in constitution-
ally problematic ways; that the ubiquity of the current lethal injection 
process is the result of a cascade to mistaken consensus; that there has 
been a significant lack of transparency surrounding the process by 
which states execute death row inmates; and that, as a result of these 
flaws, the Court in Baze must carefully scrutinize lethal injection pro-
tocols and procedures to ensure that they pass constitutional muster. 
Beyond these points, Professor Berman reasonably takes my 
Opening to task for failing to grapple with “why so many states have 
tended to repress ‘public information related to lethal injection’s ac-
tual procedures and administration.’”  In attempting to answer that 
question himself, Professor Berman places the lethal injection debate 
within the context of “three critical practical and political realities that 
surround the modern administration of capital punishment.”  And he 
concludes that these realities “infect all legal and social debates over 
capital punishment, and they significantly impede effective tinkering 
with the machinery of death.”  Although I concur with much of what 
Professor Berman argues in laying out his three political and practical 
realities—factors that result generally from the often polarized and 
overly symbolic debate about the death penalty in the United States—
I do not agree that his observations fully answer the question of why 
states refuse to allow so much information about lethal injection pro-
cedures and protocols into the public record.  More importantly, his 
observations concerning the lack of transparency and robust public 
debate are not merely descriptive, as he suggests.  Rather, these fac-
tors require that the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, vigorous-
ly scrutinize whether the realities of lethal injection procedures satisfy 
constitutional demands. 
Professor Berman’s first noted practical reality is that any system 
operated by human beings, including the administration of the death 
penalty, is fallible.  In the lethal injection context, this means that 
“there will always be at least some risk of error and unnecessary pain 
in any state killing process.”  This is unquestionably true, as the plain-
tiffs in Baze themselves acknowledge by advocating for a constitutional 
standard that upholds a method of execution unless it “creates a signif-
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icant and avoidable risk that an inmate will suffer severe pain.”  Brief for 
Petitioners at 39, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439 (Nov. 5, 2007) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/ 
LethalInjection/Public/documents/bazebriefs/2007.11.05.ky.baze.sc- 
otusmertisbrief.pdf.  Accordingly, it is not dispositive, or even legally 
relevant, that lethal injection is an improvement over previously en-
trenched execution methods such as hanging, electrocution, and le-
thal gas.  Nor do I agree with Professor Berman that the “modern de-
bate over lethal injection protocols concerns whether states, after 
adopting an improved, but still flawed execution method, should now 
have to make their protocols even more perfect.”  Considering the 
fundamental constitutional right in issue, seeking reasonable im-
provements in light of existing technologies and information is not 
the same as a disingenuous and unending search for an impossible-to-
achieve “perfection.”  An analogy to voting technology is helpful.  
Surely electronic voting machines offer some improvement over pre-
vious voting technology (no more dangling chads, for example).  
Nevertheless, in light of the constitutional right at stake, voting rights 
advocates are justified in seeking a paper trail requirement for elec-
tronic voting, even if the new technology is an improvement and even 
if a paper trail still does not make electronic voting a perfect system. 
Professor Berman’s response to my voting machine analogy might 
well be that it fails because of his second political reality factor, what 
he calls “pragmatic disinterest in death penalty perfection.”  Perhaps 
he would contend that unlike the voting technology context, in which 
there are people genuinely concerned with assuring that every legiti-
mate vote is counted, advocates on both sides of the death penalty de-
bate have no interest in genuinely improving the capital punishment 
system.  In the lethal injection context (as well as other areas of the 
death penalty debate beyond the scope of this exchange) I do not en-
tirely agree.  There are death penalty proponents—or at least those 
who firmly believe that the death penalty is and should remain consti-
tutional—who would argue genuinely that states can and should ex-
ecute defendants in a way that reasonably guards against the severe 
imposition of pain.  There are also certainly death penalty proponents 
who realize that the best way to safeguard public support for the death 
penalty is through the adoption of execution methods that are—or at 
least appear to be—as humane as reasonably possible.  To borrow 
from Professor Berman’s terminology, these individuals could be 
deemed “sophisticated [death penalty] proponents.”  The use in every 
lethal injection state of the otherwise unnecessary paralytic agent, 
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which can make potentially painful executions look like peaceful 
slumber, may well benefit the “sophisticated [death penalty] propo-
nent[’]s” cause. 
I also disagree with Professor Berman that all who challenge the 
administration of lethal injection seek only delay and are, at heart, en-
tirely disinterested in genuine improvement of the execution process.  
I gather these are Professor Berman’s “unsophisticated” abolitionists.  
It is because of their efforts, Professor Berman contends, that states 
repress public information related to lethal injection because “[s]tate 
officials believe, quite justifiably, that any information-sharing good 
deed will be punished through new rounds of litigation.”  Professor 
Berman’s cynical view overlooks that death penalty lawyers have an 
ethical obligation to challenge unconstitutional conduct by the gov-
ernment.  This obligation may include attempting to ensure that their 
clients are executed in a manner consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment.  The lawyers, of course, also have an ethical obligation not to 
bring frivolous or vexatious litigation.  Several years ago, challenges to 
lethal injection were perceived by many as just that.  However, given 
the reaction of lower court judges to the evidence of maladministra-
tion and incompetence finally surfacing in these lawsuits, such legal 
efforts appear vindicated.  More importantly, I am unconvinced that 
the lack of transparency results from states simply seeking to hasten 
executions.  If the underlying information could readily withstand 
judicial scrutiny, states would be well advised to provide information 
without the delay that has impeded judicial review of the merits of le-
thal injection procedures. 
This previous point relates to Professor Berman’s final practical 
and political reality factor:  blissful ignorance.  He argues that the 
modern death penalty debate largely occurs at the symbolic level, with 
little interest in a deeper understanding of the death penalty in its ac-
tual practice.  I agree with this important observation, but see this 
failure of informed public debate as precisely the value of the current 
lethal injection litigation.  Contrary to the impression Professor Ber-
man leaves, transparency advocates have made serious attempts to 
bring greater public access to executions through photographing or 
video recording, but courts have consistently rejected the efforts.  For 
example, in Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2004), the 
Eighth Circuit upheld a ban on the video recording of executions; the 
Fifth Circuit refused to recognize a First Amendment right to film ex-
ecutions in Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977); and a 
district court in Indiana denied a request to broadcast the execution 
of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh in Entertainment Network, 
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Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F.Supp. 2d 1002, 1013-14 (S.D. Ind. 2001).  Lethal 
injection litigation, and in particular such transparency-related efforts, 
have the potential to dramatically change the national debate.  Trans-
parency places stark reality, rather than symbolism, at the center of 
public consciousness and discourse concerning state-sponsored execu-
tions. 
What then is the answer to Professor Berman’s question of why 
states refuse to release information to the public about how they ex-
ecute people?  One answer is surely that defending the secrecy of le-
thal injection procedures is easier for the states than defending the 
Rube Goldberg machine that is the pervasive three-drug protocol ad-
ministered by the states.  Claims of protecting the identity of execu-
tioners for “personal safety” reasons, for example, is easier than de-
fending the employment of dyslexic doctors with multiple malpractice 
suits against them who have been banned from engaging in execu-
tions in other jurisdictions.  Similarly, arguing that states do not need 
to disclose the drugs or dosage amounts used in the execution process 
because doing so would be detrimental to “national security” is easier 
than justifying the use of a paralytic drug that serves no purpose other 
than to hide pain that would result from improper anesthetization. 
Another potential explanation for the states’ insistence on secrecy 
relates to a doctrinal argument that some states have used to defend 
their current lethal injection procedures.  These states note that in 
the death penalty context, the Supreme Court has required “defe-
rence . . . to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal 
system.”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976).  But the deference 
rule rests on the assumption that states have carried out at least a mi-
nimal level of investigation into a procedure that eliminates the se-
rious danger of unnecessary and cruel pain.  As the history of lethal 
injection demonstrates, the states never engaged in any such investiga-
tion.  By refusing to release information about lethal injection proto-
cols and procedures, states have largely been able to avoid having to 
justify their problematic decision making. 
Furthermore, the repression of the details of lethal injection pro-
cedures allows these states to hide behind the seeming consensus of a 
majority of death penalty states, all of whom authorize execution pur-
suant to similar lethal injection processes.  A consensus argument won 
the day when, in 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states 
from executing a person with mental retardation.  Similarly, in 2005, 
the Supreme Court held the execution of juvenile offenders unconsti-
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tutional in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).  The Supreme 
Court reached its conclusions in Atkins and Roper, at least in part, by 
tallying the number of states that prohibited the execution of the 
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders and deciding that because 
more than a majority of states rejected the practices, those practices 
conflicted with contemporary standards and, therefore, were uncons-
titutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
But the standard Eighth Amendment consensus analysis is pre-
mised upon transparency and public knowledge of a penological prac-
tice from which a consensus for or against the practice can develop.  
As I argued in my Opening, in the lethal injection context, the system-
ic failings of transparency disrupt this process.  Moreover, the lack of 
transparency obstructs the proper framing or level of generality of a 
consensus analysis.  At one level, it can be argued—as twenty states 
and the United States have argued in an amicus brief filed in Baze—
that lethal injection, and even the three-drug protocol, is accepted by 
a majority of states as the preferred method of execution.  But the le-
gal challenges to lethal injection, including the one the Supreme 
Court has heard in Baze, are not challenges to lethal injection in the 
abstract.  Rather, they are challenges to the specific protocols and 
procedures that states use to administer lethal injection.  The point of 
these challenges is that although states have chosen lethal injection as 
a supposedly more humane alternative, and have adopted a drug pro-
tocol that is meant to anesthetize an inmate prior to the injection of 
painful drugs, the implementation of the protocol in practice lends it-
self to a substantial risk that inmates will be improperly anesthetized, 
will suffer excruciating pain, but will be paralyzed and thus unable to 
make known their conscious suffering. 
Thus, in Baze, the petitioners correctly contend that to the extent 
a “consensus” analysis is relevant in the method-of-execution context, 
there is in fact a consensus in favor of execution by anesthetized death 
and the actual procedures challenged in Baze cannot stand because 
they lie outside this consensus.  In other words, the constitutional fail-
ure of the current three-drug lethal injection protocol and its imple-
mentation is that while it appears to produce an anesthetized death, 
there exists an unnecessary risk that it in fact does not.  Given the un-
informed and non-transparent public debate that Professor Berman 
has identified, it is the role of the Supreme Court to probe the troub-
ling realities of lethal injection and to ensure that even seemingly 
humane procedures actually satisfy the Constitution’s demands. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Douglas A. Berman 
I am pleased to conclude this Debate by noting yet again that Pro-
fessor Nathan and I agree more than we disagree.  In particular, like 
Professor Nathan, I believe that the “significant lack of transparency 
surrounding the process by which states execute death row inmates” 
now demands that courts “vigorously scrutinize whether the realities of 
lethal injection procedures satisfy constitutional demands.”  Neverthe-
less, as Professor Nathan correctly surmises, I still have a “cynical view” 
of the lethal injection litigation principally because, to my knowledge, 
defendants have never offered to drop their Eighth Amendment 
claims if states adopt a particular preferred execution protocol.  Pro-
fessor Nathan is justified in complaining that states haven’t been more 
forthcoming about lethal injection realities.  But states are justified in 
complaining that defendants and defense attorneys haven’t been 
more forthcoming about execution protocols they would consider 
constitutionally unassailable. 
Professor Nathan asserts that “it is not dispositive, or even legally 
relevant, that lethal injection is an improvement over previously en-
trenched execution methods such as hanging, electrocution, and le-
thal gas.”  But, even though the humane evolution of state execution 
methods may not be of great legal significance as the Justices consider 
the constitutional claims in Baze, this evolution (1) reveals that states 
have been genuinely willing to improve their execution methods, and 
(2) explains why states genuinely fear that defense attorneys, in Pro-
fessor Nathan’s words, “seek only delay and are, at heart, entirely dis-
interested in genuine improvement of the execution process.”  In this 
context, Professor Nathan’s voting technology analogy is telling.  In 
the litigation over voting technologies, advocates make clear that they 
principally desire a paper trail to accompany electronic voting me-
thods.  But, in the litigation over execution technologies, advocates 
often obscure that they principally desire the elimination of all execu-
tion methods. 
Importantly, I do not question either the judgment or ethics of 
defense lawyers challenging lethal injection protocols; indeed, when I 
have defended persons on death row, I have felt a professional obliga-
tion to raise any and every non-frivolous argument that might delay or 
prevent my client’s execution.  But the fact that defense attorneys 
have an ethical responsibility to try to delay or prevent executions 
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contributes to the “bunker mentality” that state officials have tended 
to adopt in response to evidence about flaws in their lethal injection 
protocols. 
I emphasize these realities neither to justify nor excuse many 
states’ troubling responses to the mounting evidence of problems in 
the administration of the traditional three-drug lethal injection proto-
col.  Rather, my goal is to spotlight the litigation “realpolitik” that will 
necessarily attend, and may perhaps significantly inform, the Justices’ 
consideration of the arguments in Baze.  Indeed, those Justices who 
have previously expressed concerns about extended death row litiga-
tion will surely be cognizant of the fact that nearly two decades have 
transpired since the Baze defendants committed the brutal murders 
that landed them on death row.  And, though technically Kentucky’s 
execution protocol is all that is at stake in Baze, the Justices know that 
their ruling in this case will greatly influence whether executions 
across the country are few or frequent in the months and years ahead. 
I close by stressing the litigation “realpolitik” because it helps ex-
plain not only why the Supreme Court has long avoided challenges to 
execution methods, but also the real reason Baze presents difficulties 
for the Justices.  The Justices surely realize that, no matter how much 
or how little they decide to tinker with the machinery of death in Baze, 
the broader practical and political realities that surround the modern 
administration of capital punishment ensure that the machinations of 
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